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FROMl EVIDENCE TO PROOF. By Marshall Houts. Springfield: Charles C.
Thomas, 1956. Pp. xiv, 396. $7.50.
ONE important goal of our legal system is to narrow the gap between raw fact
and forensic fact-between what happened and what, for the purpose of court
decision, is found to have happened. To be certain that the gap is completely
closed, and that the two are made one, is a goal always beyond reach but useful
as an ideal.
Marshall Houts finds cause to hope for improvement in the fact-finding
process. He seeks to contribute to this end through a book which, by his
declaration in the foreword, is an attempt at "a searching analysis of methods
to establish fact-to convert evidence into proof-without regard for the
question of admissibility."'- This opening jibe at legal learning and other jibes
at lawyers ("while lawyers know everything there is to know about the law
of evidence, they know little or nothing about evidence itself") 2 and, of course,
at law professors 3 and law schools, 4 set the tone of the book as a practical
work. Lest the whole book be misjudged, on such prima facie evidence, as
the product of a narrowly unreflective and thus impractical point of view, it
should be added that the author's statement about lawyers is made in the
context of generalizing his reaction to transcripts of testimony in cases where
a prisoner claimed that he was wrongfully convicted of murder-transcripts
which the author was reviewing as general counsel for Erle Stanley Gardner's
Court of Last Resort. Such overstatement of his point is thus to be under-
stood as a prevalent type of advocacy, and is to be tolerated even if one does
not praise it as the best advocacy. Moreover, on the whole the book appears
to be written with a considerable degree of objectivity. Who is to complain
if it is spiced occasionally with the point of view of a crusader working over
the remains of potential miscarriages of criminal justice?
The distinctive characteristic of the subject matter which sets apart each
of more than half the thirty-three chapters is the type of evidence discussed-
eyewitness identification, eyeball testimony, confessions, fingerprints, figures,
questioned documents, expert opinions, photographs, physical evidence, sound
recordings, footprints, tire-marks, hair, fiber, glass, soil, blood and semen.
Other chapters, scattered among those already identified, concern: things
1. P. viii.
2. P. vii.
3. E.g., p. vii: "Taught in too many instances by law professors who never saw the
inside of a court room. .. "
4. E.g., p. 126: "The only difficulty was that in the academic vacuum in which law
schools often exist, no one told him he would eventually be required to meet and deal
with people rather than law books."
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sought to be proved or disproved (alibi, time of death, firearms identification,
body identification and poisoning) ; types of conduct or infirmity (flight from
the scene, sexual aberration, insanity, intoxication); the nature of good in-
vestigations (Chapter 9, "The Facts, Ma'am") and investigators (Chapter
10, "Emphasize Your Empathy") ; investigative techniques for testing veracity
and overcoming resistance to questioning (Chapter 8, on polygraphs, drugs,
hypnosis and the like) ; and frustrations in the fact-finding process (Chapter
12, "And it Probably Didn't," and Chapter 30, "Murder Will Not Out").
Several unifying threads run through this miscellany. Two are implied in
comments thus far made-the relevance of each topic to the review of po-
tentially erroneous convictions, and the analysis of methods of developing
proof from evidence. The latter, being the declared aim and central theme of
the book, deserves further comment. The methods referred to are not court-
room techniques, but investigative potentials. As a result, the principal use-
fulness of the book, aside from incidentally providing interesting reading for
relaxation, is in suggesting sources and avenues of inquiry which the lawyer
and investigator might overlook. Closely allied to this value is the book's use-
fulness in suggesting lines of attack upon conclusions allegedly supported by
"scientific proof." The author achieves a balance between pointing out the
possibilities of greater use of nontestimonial evidence and the possibilities of
error in the inferences drawn from such evidence. The book is not designed
for steering the detailed pursuit of these suggested lines of inquiry, however,
since by its nature it is a rather summary treatment of a wide range of topics.
Also, it contains relatively few references to more exhaustive treatments of
the subject matter. These are, of course, not adverse criticisms of the work
of the author; they are rather indications of limitations inherent in the type of
book he set out to write. And despite these limitations, any lawyer actively
concerned with investigations, either as trial counsel or otherwise, would find
it worthwhile to browse in the book and to read more carefully the discussion
of types of investigation likely to be useful in his practice.
A third unifying thread is less clearly congenial to the views of the book's
author. It is the inevitable imperfection of our evidence-developing and fact-
finding techniques. The imperfection of methods now used is a main theme,
and the narration of supporting illustrations continues throughout the book.
Also, the imperfection of the best methods now possible is occasionally noted.r
It is only a small step further, and hardly a bold one in the light of what we
know of human nature, to the conclusion that imperfection is inevitable. From
that conclusion, in turn, grows the necessity for considering what we can
do to get along reasonably well despite such imperfection.
The concept of probability is an effort to deal with this problem. Yet the
5. E.g., the author expresses the view that experiments concerning identification
of hairs by scale counts are too inconclusive to warrant "positive determination of common
origin," p. 322, and that fiber characteristics as now understood may eliminate the possi-
bility of common source, but never establish "positive common source," p. 324.
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author, by resort to his dictionary, distinguishes evidence of probability from
proof,6 and adds:
"I have discussed the matter with several mathematicians and they are
unanimous in their opinions that the law of probability has absolutely no
application to the forensic field. Its mathematical utility is founded on exact
statistical research; and in no field of proof has this research progressed
to a point sufficient to warrant the use of precise mathematical equations.
I am further advised that the type of research required is not likely to
come within the foreseeable future."
'7
These and the author's supporting comments are to be applauded insofar
as they urge more reliance than at present upon careful and full development
of potential evidence and less reliance upon the concept of probability, which
comes into use only to resolve the uncertainties remaining because the evidence
and inferences to be drawn from it are inconclusive. Also, in disapproving
of the application of precise mathematical equations to problems of forensic
proof, the author makes a point which is valid, at least as to fact-finding by a
jury. The product of application of a mathematical equation is, at best, no
more accurate than the assumed values of "known" factors from which the
"unknown" in the equation is to be determined. Upon reflection, the ordinary
fact-finder in the jury box, as well as on the bench, would accept this propo-
sition. To one who bears it in mind and treats the result of the equation
not as a final answer but as a proposition which can be accepted only after all
of the assumptions (including the assumed relations asserted by the equation
itself) have been carefully tested, this way of thinking about the fact-finding
problem may be useful sometimes. But interposing a mathematical process
between the doubtful assumptions and the final assertion tends to distract
attention from the significance of the doubts, and to give the assertion a false
ring of certainty. Thus there is danger of giving undue weight to an
argument which the advocate presents in the form of a mathematical
calculation. One doubtful assumption, together with the fact that the
whole calculation is dependent upon it, is easily forgotten when attention
is focused upon other apparently valid assumptions and upon the sup-
posedly precise process of calculating from the assumptions an answer
to the ultimate fact question. This danger is the more grave if the one to
whom the argument is addressed is untrained and inexperienced in fact-finding.
Because of the risk of such misuse of reasoning by equation, that technique
of fact-finding is on the whole less satisfactory for use by the ordinary jury
than is answering disputed questions by a judgment of probabilities based on
weighing competing inferences in a general way-an intuitive way it might
be called-without resort to supposed mathematical precision.
6. He states, at p. 132: "My dictionary defines probability as 'The state or quality
of being probable.' Probable is then defined as '1. Having more evidence than the con-
trary but not proof. . . .'
7. P. 132.
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The author illustrates this danger of misusing arguments based on proba-
bilities by a case involving identification of a murder weapon.8 Though the
firearms expert testified that he could not say that the fatal bullet had been
fired from the suspect gun, the prosecutor in his jury argument assigned
probabilities figures to each of several common characteristics of the fatal
bullet and the test bullet, and from these assigned figures he calculated that
there was a one to four hundred chance that such matching would occur
otherwise than by firing of the fatal bullet from the suspect gun. The author
points out that the common characteristics were all class characteristics, and
that the fatal bullet might have been fired from any one of thousands of
other guns of the same caliber and make. Even without this expert knowl-
edge that the common characteristics were class characteristics, one can
readily see fallacies in the prosecutor's argument by looking at his assump-
tions-his assigned figures. For example, the argument notes that there are
at least seven different kinds of calibers, and then proceeds "conservatively":
"Let's make it one in five" that the caliber of the fatal bullet will be the same
as that of the suspect gun, if it is not assumed that it was fired from that
gun. It is, of course, a long leap, and anything but mathematical precision,
from the proposition that there are at least seven types of calibers to the
proposition that the chances are conservatively one in five that a given bullet
will be the same caliber as a given gun. This leap cannot be made, even
plausibly, unless an ignorance of all other relevant factors is assumed; and a
few questions make it apparent that it is not sensible to act on that assumption.
How may guns and bullets of each caliber have been manufactured? What is
the pattern of distribution of each type?
Other assumptions made in the prosecutor's argument are likewise falla-
cious. Consider just one more. It is assumed that, since there are two kinds
of rifling (right hand and left hand), the chances are one in two that the
rifling of the fatal bullet and suspect gun will be the same if it is not assumed
that the bullet was fired from the gun, and that the chances of common
rifling and common caliber are, by a simple multiplication, one in ten. This
argument is based on the assumption, among others, that there is an equal
distribution of right and left hand rifling among guns of the given caliber-
an assumption one can hardly expect to be true even if he knows next to
nothing about guns. The fallacies in this argument may seem too apparent
to make the point that juries are likely to be misled, but the author reports
that the defendants were convicted, and that he thinks one of them was
innocent. He also concludes that the convictions attest the success of the
prosecutor's fallacious argument. Even recognizing that this latter conclusion
is not necessarily sound, one is likely to feel uneasy about the chance that the
argument influenced the verdict. Parenthetically, one method available for
preventing effective use of such misleading argument is resort to legal learn-




tion or some phase of it) or arguments (if the attorney is expressing it). If
the fallacies are subtle or are dependent on expert knowledge, careful prepara-
tion to discover and expose them will also be required.
Perhaps a sympathetic reading of the passage quoted above supports the
conclusion that the author meant nothing more extreme than the two propo-
sitions that more reliance should be placed upon full development of potential
evidence and that application of mathematical equations in forensic proof is
unwarranted. Perhaps he was thinking of "the law" of probability in terms
only of the use of "precise mathematical equations." But if, as one might read
this passage, it urges banishing from the forensic field the concept of proba-
bility in any form, it goes too far. The concept of probability is not only useful
but also essential to any rational and just system of forensic fact-finding. This
seems to be recognized implicitly, though not explicitly, at other points in the
book. For example, the author speaks approvingly of the expert's conclusion
that "in all probability" paint on the hit-and-run victim's clothing came from
the suspect car because "the points of identity are strong," 9 and of the expert's
conclusion that "in all probability" two specimens of hair came from the same
source, because, among other identifying characteristics, a combination of two
rare diseases was indicated by each specimen. 10 Even when the phraseology
of probability is not used, it is clear on reflection that the concept of proba-
bility is used in the process of fact-finding both inside the courtroom and out-
side. It is a device for reaching a decision dependent upon a question of fact,
though the truth is not known.
The problem is that evidence is inconclusive even when the task of develop-
ing it has been well done. "Proof," even when used in contrast with "evi-
dence," does not imply absolute certainty, but rather a degree of probability
high enough to satisfy a standard of judgment. Standards vary according to
the types of cases. In criminal cases the standards are more stringent than
in civil. Among civil cases, also, the standards vary. A special standard
is sometimes applied to fraud cases, for example. One way such variations are
expressed is in the statement of the burden of proof. Another way is that
as the availability of evidence is greater, we expect more evidence to be
produced. Courts often say that there must be a preponderance of the evi-
dence in favor of a given fact-finding urged by the party with the burden of
proof. Often, also, they say that the fact-finding must be reached on the
basis of probabilities, and not merely speculation and conjecture. These re-
quirements amount to something more than merely a finding of probability as
determined from whatever evidence happens to be before the tribunal and what-
ever assumptions the fact-finder might make as to points on which the evidence
is inconclusive. The expressions used by the courts imply, if they do not
explicitly state, the requirement of a reasoned inference from evidence and
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ence.' Suppose that a plaintiff rests after proving, as to the way in which
an accident occurred, only that he was a back seat passenger in a car which
collided with defendant's truck on narrow pavement at the crest of a hill. If
the case were to be decided on the basis of this meager evidence, supplemented
only by the assumptions attributed to common experience, one might reason-
ably infer that it is more probable that the wider truck was over the center
line, or that both were, than that only the car was thus situated. But the
plaintiff would not get his case to the jury on that basis. More evidence is
expected and demanded. The amount of additional evidence demanded is
dependent on the amount which experience indicates is usually available.
If all occupants of the car are killed, for example, less evidence is demanded
than if both the driver and passenger are available. To some extent this propo-
sition is expressed in legal rules regarding burden of proof in death cases.
Undoubtedly it actually has much broader application in practice, both with
respect to direction of verdicts and with respect to fact-finding by a judge
or jury.
The author's plea for maximum reliance upon full and careful development
of the evidence does not appear to be addressed to courts as a suggestion
concerning legal doctrine. In fact, however, the judicial demand for some
quantity of evidence to support the fact-finder's reasoned inference is a way
of giving effect, within limits, to the author's thesis. Surely, also, the amount
of evidence demanded in judicial proceedings is influenced by advances in
scientific knowledge and investigative techniques, for these matters affect the
availability of evidence. It is clear that when scientific advances have sharply
improved investigative techniques relevant to a criminal case, it is proper to
demand more evidence from the prosecution to make a submissible case than
would have been required in a similar case in other days. It is arguable that
the same is true in civil cases, provided cost of developing the additional
evidence is given due consideration as one of the factors bearing on its avail-
ability.
The necessity for making use of the concept of probabilities, in a generalized
way though not as a mathematical calculation, is one corollary of the inevit-
able imperfection of evidence-developing and fact-finding techniques. A second
corollary concerns human failings of the participants in the fact-finding
process. In his foreword the author declares: "In our adversary system, the
objective search for fact is possible only if the parties are equally matched."' 2
If this is so, in a literal sense, then the objective search is never possible, since
the parties are never matched exactly equally. Probably the author means only
that the parties must be about equally matched. Even this assertion en-
courages a false appraisal of the merits and limitations of the adversary
system. Of course the system works best when each of the adverse parties
is well represented, and this is the ideal for which we should be striving. But




it is too much to hope that representation of such quality will be achieved
always, or even usually, in the mass of relatively small cases which are the
only contacts of most citizens with the litigation process. To reach a sound
appraisal of the adversary system, it must be considered in comparison with
other possibilities. The alternative most often suggested is that we depend
more upon impartial judges and experts to do the fact-finding without benefit
or interference of advocates appearing on behalf of the parties. Declared
advocates might thus be eliminated or relegated to a smaller role, but not
advocacy. Advocacy would be in the hands of judges and experts and would
be expressed in such ways as their choice of lines of inquiry and of witnesses,
and their penchant for acceptance of their own first thoughts and for resistance
to other ideas. Impartiality of the fact-finder would not insure equality of
advocacy of the competing points of view. On the whole, something respect-
ably near to equality of advocacy and sound fact-findings is more likely to be
achieved within the adversary system than within a system not making use
of persons frankly designated as advocates.
I do not mean to say that the book's author appears ready to scrap the ad-
versary system. But I am concerned that his foreword contributes to a
popular confusion (not exclusively among laymen) which treats every imper-
fection of the adversary system as a ground for condemnation, without distinc-
tion between imperfections which are avoidable and others which are inevitable
in any system of human judgment.
The how-to-do-it book is currently as popular among lawyers as the do-it-
yourself kit among householders. Each is useful. But even painstaking use
of the householder's kit rarely produces anything like the picture on the
package. Kits and books are best supplemented with some frank consideration
of how to live with divergence between the picture and the product, which,
despite its shortcomings, may be a bargain. The worth of the adversary system
is seen in comparison with other possible systems, not in comparison with the
unattainable ideal of completely closing the gap between raw fact and forensic
fact.
ROBERT E. KEETONt
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND A.MERICAN DEMOCRATIC STATESMANSHIP. By
Dexter Perkins. Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1956. Pp. xxiv, 200. $3.50.
PROFESSOR Dexter Perkins, leading American diplomatic historian and au-
thority on the Monroe Doctrine, has undertaken a brief survey of the public
life of Charles Evans Hughes. Unfortuqately the study adds little to our com-
prehension of the statesman 'beyond what has already been provided in the
works of Merlo Pusey and Samuel Hendel. 1 In his final paragraph Mr. Per-
tProfessor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (1951); HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND
THE SUPREME COURT (1951).
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